




When false memories do not occur:  
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The aim of the present study was to evaluate two explanations for the non-occurrence 
of false memories in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. One explanation was 
that a critical lure is not recalled because the list failed to evoke it in the participant’s mind. 
Another possible explanation was that the participant would identify the critical lure and 
would remember, at the time of recall, that the lure was not produced by an external source. In 
order to explore these two possible explanations for the non-occurrence of false memories, an 
experimental phase was added to the usual DRM paradigm: participants were asked to recall 
items they thought of but they did not recall because these items were not members of the list 
presented by the experimenter. Among participants who did not recall the critical lure during 
the standard recall task, those who recalled the critical lure during the additional phase 
outnumbered those who did not recall it. This result is more consistent with the second 














In recent years, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm has been widely 
used in order to study the occurrence of false memories. In this paradigm lists of thematically 
related words such as bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, etc., are presented to participants. On 
later memory tests (e.g. recall or recognition tests) participants often claim to remember a 
word which was not actually presented (the critical lure) such as sleep. 
Important properties of this “false memory” effect have been described in the 
literature. Subjects appear to be highly confident that the critical lures were presented (Payne, 
Elie, Blackwell,& Neuschatz, 1996; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and claim to recall or 
recognize the critical lures on the basis of conscious recollection rather than a mere familiarity 
feeling (Payne et al., 1996; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). According to Mather, Henkel, & 
Johnson (1997) the rate of “Remember” responses is, nevertheless, higher for actually 
presented items than for critical lures. Moreover, subjects often attribute an external source to 
the critical lures, and they do it only slightly less often than they attribute a source for actually 
presented items (Lampinen, Neuschatz, & Payne, 1999; Payne et al., 1996). Several studies 
have shown that this false memory effect persists over retention interval of 24 and 48 hours 
(McDermott, 1996; Payne et al., 1996; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). More recently, Toglia, 
Neuschatz and Goodwin (1999) showed that long retention interval (one week and three 
weeks) had no effect on recall of critical non-presented items and on the confidence in these 
illusory recollections. 
Several researchers have found evidence for differences between the qualitative 
characteristics of true and false memories. Mather et al. (1997) reported that memories for 
perceived words include more auditory detail and more remembered feelings than memories 
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for critical lures. Norman and Schacter (1997) found that subjects recalled more sensory and 
contextual detail (e.g. information concerning the list position) for studied items than for 
nonpresented theme words. More recently, Lampinen et al. (1999) showed that subjects were 
more confident in their source attributions for presented items than for critical lures. They 
were also more likely to change source attributions for critical lures than for presented items. 
Although there are subtle differences between true and false memories, the false memory 
effect obtained in the DRM paradigm is very robust (for an extensive review see Roediger, 
McDermott & Robinson, 1998). 
The aim of the present study was to address the following question: Why do some 
participants recall no false memories? One possible explanation for an absence of recall of a 
critical lure is that the list did not cause the participant to think of the target theme-consistent 
word. A completely different explanation is that the participant did think of the critical lure 
while hearing the list but was able to remember that the word had not, in fact, been presented 
by the experimenter (or another external source). Which of these explanations best accounts 
for the absence of occurrence of false memories? Do participants recall no false memories 
because they do not process the critical lure, or rather, because they successfully remember 
that the critical lure was not uttered by an external source? 
In order to evaluate these hypotheses, the classical phases of the DRM paradigm i.e. 
recall (phase I) and confidence rating (phase II) were followed by a phase during which, for 
each list, participants were asked to say whether a word came to their mind during the 
experiment but they did not recall it because they thought it had not been uttered by the 
experimenter. The two hypotheses discussed above lead to divergent predictions about what 
participants who did not recall the critical lure in phase I will do during this additional phase 
(phase III). If the first explanation is correct, it is predicted that, among participants who did 
not recall a critical lure in phase I, those who will not recall this critical lure in phase III 
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should outnumber those who will recall it in this phase. Indeed, a participant who did not 
think of a critical lure in phase I is not likely to recall it in phase III.  
The prediction from the second explanation is the opposite. According to this 
explanation participants who did not recall a false memory in phase I processed the critical 
lure but remembered that this word was not spoken by an external source. If this explanation 
is correct, it is predicted that, among participants who did not recall a critical lure in phase I, 



















Forty undergraduate student volunteers (27 females, 13 males) participated. Their ages 
were between 18 and 28 (mean age = 22.4 years). 
 
Materials 
The study material consisted of 8 lists of 10 items (all the lists appear in the 
Appendix). These lists were constructed on the basis of two pilot studies. In the first pilot 
study 10 participants were presented with 10 lists of words. For each list, these participants’ 
task was, first, to identify the person who was associated with the presented words, and then 
to rate the degree of association between each word and the target person on a 7-point scale (1 
= word not associated with the target person; 7 = word strongly associated with the target 
person). For the 8 lists, each target person was identified by all the participants. These target 
persons were four cartoon characters (Captain Haddock, Lucky Luke, Obelix and Peter Pan) 
and four real persons (Louis De Funès (a French actor), Adolf Hitler, J. F. Kennedy and 
Claudia Schiffer). A one-way ANOVA taking the words as the random factor showed that the 
mean degree of associations between list words and their target person (mean = 4.96; sd = 
0.44) did not vary significantly across the lists (F(7,72) = 1.28; MSe = 1.72; p>.20).  
The second pilot study was aimed at evaluating whether the 8 lists were equally 
effective with respect to the generation of a mental image of the target person. Fifteen new 
participants listened to the experimenter reading each list of words in the same conditions as 
those described below for the main experiment. Participants were instructed to stop the 
experimenter’s reading each time the mental image of a person not mentioned before came to 
mind and to name that person. If the mental image corresponded to the target person then the 
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experimenter said “OK” and passed to the following list, otherwise the experimenter went on 
reading the list until the next stop. A one-way ANOVA taking the subjects as the random 
factor was carried out on the number of words read by the experimenter before the participant 
gave a stop signal and named the target person. This analysis revealed no significant 
difference across the lists (F(7,98) = 1.07; MSe = 2.04; p > .20; mean number of words read = 





Participants were tested individually. They were told that 8 lists of 10 items each 
would be read by the experimenter and that they would be tested immediately after each list 
by writing (using a black pen) the words on an experimental sheet. They were asked to recall 
as many words as possible in any order from the list they had just heard. They were also 
instructed not to guess wildly. The 8 lists were presented in a different random order to each 
participant. The lists were read aloud at the approximate rate of 1 word per 1.5 sec. Within 
each list, items were presented in order of decreasing association with the target person’s 
name (the critical lure). Participants were given 90 seconds to recall each list (Phase I). 
In the first post-recall task (Phase II), the participants were asked to assign a rating 
between 1 and 5 for each recalled word to reflect their confidence in having heard the word as 
part of the list (1 = not very confident, 3 = fairly confident and 5 = extremely confident that 
the experimenter uttered the word).  
In a second post-recall task (Phase III), the participants were given a brown pen and 
were instructed as follows: “While I was reading the words of a list or during the recall task, it 
could have been that a word came to your mind but you did not write it down because you 
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thought that I had not produced it”. Then, the experimenter presented successively each list of 
words recalled by the participant in phase I and asked him or her to write the word(s) he or 
she had thought of for that list. Participants were asked to write only words they remembered 
having thought of during the presentation of lists and not to infer or guess words from the 
present instructions. Finally, the participants were asked to assign a rating between 1 and 5 for 
each word recalled in phase III to reflect their confidence in not having heard the 
experimenter producing that word (1 = not very confident, 3 = fairly confident and 5 = 





Correct recall and confidence. First, the eight lists were compared with respect to the 
correct recall of presented items. The proportion of participants who made a correct recall was 
computed for each item. In all statistical analyses that follow the alpha level was set at .05. A 
one-way ANOVA taking the items as the random factor showed no significant difference 
across the eight lists (F(7,72) = 0.60; MSe = 0.023). Descriptive data are presented in table 1. 
The lists were then compared with respect to confidence ratings assigned to correctly 
recalled items. The mean rated confidence was computed for each item across participants 
who correctly recalled the item. A one-way ANOVA taking the items as the random factor 
showed no significant difference across the lists (F(7,72) = 1.31; MSe = 0.032). Descriptive 
data are presented in Table 1. 
In short, correct recall of presented words and confidence in having heard these items were 





INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
False recall and confidence (Phase I). The numbers of participants who recalled the 
critical lures across the eight lists is presented in Table 2. Although a formal analysis using a 
chi-square analysis in order to compare the eight lists was not possible (the proportion of cells 
in which the expected values were smaller than 5 exceeded .20) it appeared that the number of 
occurrences of the critical lures strongly varied across the lists. A chi-square analysis carried 
out on the six lists which produced at least one false memory was technically possible and 
confirmed that impression by showing a statistically significant difference (chi-square = 
36.63; df = 5).  
Although the lists were similar with respect to the average degree of association with 
the target person and their effectiveness in generating a mental image of the critical lures, 
only two lists induced a fair number of false memories. The Claudia Schiffer list induced the 




INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Overall, 25 participants (62.5%) recalled at least one critical lure in phase I. As in 
Read (1996), confidence ratings assigned to study words were compared to confidence ratings 
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assigned to critical lures for these participants. As in Read’s (1996) study, confidence ratings 
assigned to recalled study items (mean = 4.71; sd = 0.26) and critical lures (mean = 4.05; sd = 
0.94) were significantly different (t(24) = 3.35). This significant difference is difficult to 
interpret because of the ceiling effect occurring for ratings assigned to study items. 
Nevertheless, the mean confidence assigned to critical lures is relatively high, slightly higher 
than that reported by Read (i.e. 3.81) who also used a 5-point rating scale.  
 
Not processing the lure or remembering that it was not heard? (Phase III). An 
important point of the present study was to examine the recall of critical lure in phase III in 
order to better understand how to explain the non-occurrence of false memories in a DRM-
like situation. The following analyses concerned the responses of participants who did not 
recall false memories in phase I. The number of participants who produced the critical lure in 
response to the instructions given in phase III is presented in Table 2. For each list, a chi-
square test was used to compare the number of participants who recalled the critical lure in 
phase III with the number of participants who did not (column “no recall” in Table 2). These 
analyses reveal that for every list the number of participants who recalled the critical lure was 
significantly higher than the number of participants who did not (using the same order of 
presentation of lists as in Table 2, the chi-square values were respectively 6.00, 10.12, 6.08, 
4.57, 9.26, 4.33, 8.10 and 19.60 with 1 degree of freedom for each analysis). 
 Overall, 38 participants recalled critical lures in phase III. Their mean confidence of 
not having heard the critical lures was 4.38 (s.d. = 0.60).  
 Finally, the number of occurrences of recall of the critical lure in one of the recall 
tasks (either phase I or phase II) was not significantly different across the eight lists (chi-








A large diversity in the effectiveness of the lists in inducing false memories was 
observed. Wide differences in effectiveness of the lists have also been recently reported by 
Stadler, Roediger and McDermott (1999). As shown by Stadler et al., it is not easy understand 
which factors underlie such a variability. In the present study, the two lists which induced a 
fair number of false memories shared the following property: the critical lure was similar to a 
study item both with respect to physical resemblance of the persons and to phonological 
similarity of the names. Obelix (critical lure) and Asterix (study item) are both Gallic warriors 
bearing a moustache, braids and a helmet covering just the top of the head. Their names 
contain three syllables and end with the phonemes /iks/. Claudia Schiffer (critical lure) and 
Cindy Crawford (study item) are both beautiful young (around 30), Caucasian, long haired 
and tall top models. Their names are composed of a two-syllable first name and a two-syllable 
surname. Moreover, in both cases, the two persons are often contextually associated. Asterix 
and Obelix are very often pictured together in the “Asterix” strip cartoon. Cindy Crawford 
and Claudia Schiffer appeared together in advertising pictures (e.g. for cosmetics) and they 
are often seen both on the same pages of magazines or in TV programs reporting fashion 
shows. The importance of associative relatedness (i.e. frequent co-occurrence) has been 
demonstrated in the field of familiar people recognition. Indeed, it has been shown that 
associative relatedness rather than category membership per se is responsible for the so-called 
“semantic priming” of face recognition (Barry, Johnston, & Scanlan, 1998; Young, Flude, 
Hellawell, & Ellis, 1994). Investigating the influence of such factors in the future should 
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contribute to a better understanding of why some lists are more effective in inducing the recall 
of critical lures when these lures are people’s names. 
 
 The aim of the present study was to evaluate two possible explanations for the non-
occurrence of false memories. The absence of recall of a critical lure could be due to the fact 
that a list did not lead a participant to think of the target name. Another explanation for this 
absence of false memory is that the participant thought of the target name while hearing the 
list and was able to keep in mind that this name had not been produced by an external source. 
A new experimental phase was added to the usual recall (Phase I) and confidence rating 
(Phase II) phases of the DRM paradigm in order to test these hypotheses. During that 
additional phase (Phase III) participants were instructed to recall words they thought of but 
they did not recall in phase I because those words were not uttered by the experimenter. If the 
first explanation is correct, we should find, among those participants who did not recall the 
critical lure in phase I, more participants who would not recall the critical lure in phase III 
than participants who would recall it. The reverse prediction could be made from the second 
explanation. 
 Results are more consistent with the second explanation than with the first. Indeed, for 
all the lists, there were significantly more participants who recalled the critical lure in phase 
III than participants who did not. Thus, the absence of  recall of a critical lure in phase I seems 
to be mainly explained by the fact that the participant identified the target person while 
hearing a list but was able to remember that this person’s name was not produced by an 
external source. The non-occurrence of false memories is best explained by a successful 
source monitoring activity rather than by the fact that a list failed to make the critical lure 
come to the participant’s mind. One cannot totally exclude that in some cases a critical lure 
was not recalled because the participant did not identify the target person while hearing a list. 
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Indeed, the proportions of participants who did not recall the critical lure in phase III varied 
from .15 to .33 across the lists (see Table 2). But the non-identification of the target lure did 
not appear to be the major cause of absence of recall of false memories. It might be argued 
that an absence of recall of the critical lure in phase III does not necessarily mean that this 
critical lure was not activated at all during encoding. However, this possibility does not alter 
the conclusion of the study. Indeed, such an argument may imply that the number of 
participants who did not identify the target person in phase I was overestimated. But this 
argument does not concern the estimate of participants who processed the critical lure in 
phase I and remembered that it had not been produced by an external source. Therefore, in the 
present study, the absence of recall of false memories remains better explained by an ability to 
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    Correct recall   Confidence 
List    ------------------------------------------------- 
Claudia Schiffer  0.81     4.79 
Obélix    0.83    4.76 
John F. Kennedy  0.76    4.77 
Peter Pan   0.84    4.77 
Louis De Funès  0.74    4.67 
Captain Haddock  0.78    4.63 
Adolph Hitler   0.76    4.70 
Lucky Luke   0.81    4.65 
M    0.79    4.72 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 1. Proportion of participants who recalled a study item averaged across the ten words of 












    Recall of the critical lure in  No recall  
   Phase I Phase III 
List    -------------------------------------------------------- 
Claudia Schiffer  16  18   6 
Obélix    8  25   7 
John F. Kennedy  3  26   11 
Peter Pan   3  25   12 
Louis De Funès  1  29   10 
Captain Haddock  1  26   13 
Adolph Hitler   0  29   11 
Lucky Luke   0  34   6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2. Number of occurrences of recall and of absence of recall of the critical lure in phase I 















Critical lures with list items 1 to 10. The names of strip cartoon characters are sometimes 
different in the English and in the French version of the story. In such cases, the name used in 
the French version is given into parentheses. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
CLAUDIA SCHIFFER: David Copperfield, fashion, Citroën Xantia, Cindy Crawford, Naomi 
Campbell, Kate Moss, Brigitte Bardot, magazine, accent, engagement 
OBELIX: Asterix, menhir, potion, Dogmatix (Idéfix), Getafix (Panoramix), boar, Falbala, 
pot, Caesar, helmet 
JOHN F. KENNEDY: Assassination, Marilyn Monroe, Bill Clinton, Dallas, Kevin Costner, 
democrat, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, airport, bridge* 
PETER PAN: Captain Hook, Tinkerbell, Wendy, Mr Smee (Mr Mouche), Robin Williams, 
flight, London, crocodile, flute, alarm clock 
LOUIS DE FUNES: gendarme, St Tropez, rabbi, sucker (corniaud), Bourvil, gallivant, Michel 
Galabru, Jean Lefèvre, Yves Montand, Jean Marais 
CAPTAIN HADDOCK: Tintin, oath, alcohol, pipe, beard, Calculus (Tournesol), Snowy 
(Milou), Dupont, cap, Castafiore 
ADOLPH HITLER: Nazi, extermination, race, Berlin, Mussolini, Le Pen, Stalin, suicide, 
Pétain, Pinochet 
LUCKY LUKE: Jolly Jumper, cow-boy, revolver, shadow, Joe Dalton, Rintincan (Ran Tan 
Plan), speed, cigarette, Calamity Jane, Billy The Kid 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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